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ABORTION POST-GLUCKSBERG AND POST-GONZALES: APPLYING AN 
ANALYSIS THAT DEMANDS EQUALITY FOR WOMEN UNDER THE LAW 
MARY KATHRYN NAGLE* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
[Abortions] are  . . .  disastrous to a woman’s mental, moral, and physical 
wellbeing.1 
Traditionally, such discrimination [against women] was rationalized by an 
attitude of ‘romantic paternalism’ which, in practical effect, put women, not on a 
pedestal, but in a cage.2 
While we find no reliable data to measure the phenomenon, it seems 
unexceptionable to conclude some women come to regret their choice to abort 
the infant life they once created and sustained.  Severe depression and loss of 
esteem can follow.3 
The Partial Birth Abortion Act of 20034 is a sex-based classification that 
discriminates against women. Although the government’s proclaimed interest in 
saving unborn life is certainly commendable,5 the Act’s use of a sex-based 
classification violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. In place of the numerous non-discriminatory policies and 
programs that have proven effective in preventing the termination of unwanted 
pregnancies and in protecting unborn life,6 the government has chosen to use a 
sex-based classification that requires only women to sacrifice their freedom, 
personal autonomy, liberty, health, and economic equality.7 Even though 
 
 * Law Clerk to the Hon. Joseph Bataillon and the Hon. Laurie Smith Camp, United States 
District Court, District of Nebraska.  All views expressed and any errors in this article are solely 
attributable to the author.  The author would like to thank Vice-Dean Stephen Griffin for his 
thoughts and feedback on several different versions of this article. 
 1. HORATIO ROBINSON STORER, WHY NOT? 76 (1867). 
 2. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 684 (1973). 
 3. Gonzales v. Carhart, 127 S. Ct. 1610, 1634 (2007) (internal citations omitted). 
 4. 18 U.S.C. § 1531(b)(1)(A) (2003). 
 5. See Casey v. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa., 505 U.S. 833, 846 (1992) (holding that 
“the State has legitimate interests from the outset of the pregnancy in protecting . . . the fetus that 
may become a child.”). 
 6. See Jack M. Balkin, Roe v. Wade: An Engine of Controversy, in WHAT ROE V. WADE SHOULD 
HAVE SAID 3, 5 (Jack Balkin ed., 2005). 
 7. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1531(b)(1)(A) (2003) (criminalizing the abortion of a fetus contained 
within the body of a woman—without enacting any similar restrictions on a man’s reproductive 
activities that give rise to the creation or preservation of unborn life). 
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unwanted pregnancies cannot be created without the reproductive organs of 
both a woman and a man, the Act does not require men to sacrifice any freedom, 
personal autonomy, liberty, health, or economic equality to prevent any 
abortions. Furthermore, extensive evidence indicates that the government’s use 
of this sex-based classification in abortion regulation ultimately fails to achieve 
the government’s compelling objective.8 Consequently, the government cannot 
provide an “exceedingly persuasive justification” for its decision to selectively 
encumber the liberty and equality of women only.9 Because the government 
cannot satisfy the exceedingly persuasive justification standard applied to all 
sex-based classifications,10 the Act does not pass constitutional muster under the 
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
This is certainly not a new argument, as many constitutional law scholars 
have argued that abortion regulations violate the Fourteenth Amendment’s 
Equal Protection Clause.11 The Court’s recent decision in Gonzales v. Carhart,12 
however, provides compelling new evidence to reinforce the argument that 
abortion regulations, since their inception in the first half of the nineteenth 
century, have always discriminated on the basis of sex in violation of the Equal 
Protection Clause. Further, Gonzales signals the beginning of the now inevitable 
demise of Roe v. Wade’s constitutional jurisprudence,13 and consequently, the 
 
 8. See infra, notes 137–147. 
 9. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 531 (1996) (“Parties who seek to defend gender-based 
government action must demonstrate an ‘exceedingly persuasive justification’ for that action.”). 
 10. See id. 
 11. See Jack M. Balkin, How New Genetic Technologies Will Transform Roe v. Wade, 56 EMORY L.J. 
843, 851 (2007) (arguing that “by viewing the abortion right as part of a generalized right of privacy, 
the Court obscured the relationship between women's reproductive liberty and their equality with 
men.”); Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Some Thoughts on Autonomy and Equality in Relation to Roe v. Wade, 63 
N.C. L. REV. 375, 386 (1985) (“[T]he Court’s Roe position is weakened, I believe, by the opinion’s 
concentration on a medically approved autonomy idea, to the exclusion of a constitutionally based 
sex equality perspective.”); Sylvia A. Law, Rethinking Sex and the Constitution, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 955 
(1984) (arguing that “the development of modern constitutional sex equality doctrine has suffered 
from a lack of focus on biological reproductive differences between men and women.”); Eileen 
McDonagh, The Next Step After Roe: Using Fundamental Rights, Equal Protection Analysis to Nullify 
Restrictive State-level Abortion Legislation, 56 EMORY L.J. 1173, 1174 (2007) (“As many legal scholars 
have recommended for decades, the answer to the question of how to strengthen reproductive rights 
is to add constitutional guarantees under the Equal Protection Clause to the current foundation of 
abortion rights based upon the Due Process Clause.”); Reva Siegel, Siegel, J., Concurring, in WHAT 
ROE V. WADE SHOULD HAVE SAID 63, 63 (Jack M. Balkin ed., 2005) (“Too often, laws that single 
women out for special treatment in virtue of their maternal role have excluded women from 
participating as equals with men in core activities of citizenship.”); Cass Sunstein, The Anticaste 
Principle, 92 MICH. L. REV. 2410, 2425 (1994) (arguing for the application of Equal Protection Clause 
analysis  where “the law takes a characteristic limited to one group of citizens and turns that 
characteristic into a source of social disadvantage.”). Cf. Elizabeth M. Schneider, The Synergy of 
Equality and Privacy in Women’s Rights, 2002 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 137, 145 (2002) (arguing “for the 
importance of viewing privacy and equality in tandem and examining the synergy between the two 
doctrines in women’s rights cases.”). 
 12. 127 S. Ct. 1610 (2007). 
 13. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973) (“This right of privacy, whether it be founded in the 
Fourteenth Amendment’s concept of personal liberty and restrictions upon state action, as we feel it 
is, or, as the District Court determined, in the Ninth Amendment's reservation of rights to the 
people, is broad enough to encompass a woman’s decision whether or not to terminate her 
pregnancy.”). 
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need to supplant Roe’s substantive due process analysis with an Equal 
Protection Clause framework. Although the Court has successively narrowed 
the definition of the right Roe first defined,14 the Gonzales Court went one step 
further when, in defiance of the Court’s prior holding in Stenberg v. Carhart,15 the 
Gonzales Court held that the absence of a health and safety exception for the 
woman did not render the Act “invalid on its face.”16 To justify this decision, the 
Gonzales Court invoked “ancient notions about women’s place in the family and 
under the Constitution—ideas that have long since been discredited” as 
 
 14. See, e.g., Casey v. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa., 505 U.S. 833, 837 (1992) (granting 
states the freedom to impose some restrictions on a woman’s fundamental right to abortion, so long 
as that restriction does not constitute an “undue burden”). 
 15. 530 U.S. 914, 921 (2000) (“[S]ubsequent to viability, the State in promoting its interest in the 
potentiality of human life may, if it chooses, regulate, and even proscribe, abortion except where it is 
necessary, in appropriate medical judgment, for the preservation of the life or health of the mother.”) 
(internal quotations omitted). 
 16. Gonzales, 127 S. Ct. at 1637–38 (holding that despite the fact that “some recitations in the Act 
are factually incorrect[,] . . . [c]onsiderations of marginal safety, including the balance of risks, are 
within the legislative competence when the regulation is rational and in pursuit of legitimate ends . . 
. . The Act is not invalid on its face where there is uncertainty over whether the barred procedure is 
ever necessary to preserve a woman's health. . . .”) (emphasis added).  This unquestioned deference 
to the Legislature is remarkable considering the Court has not granted the Legislature the same 
leniency under the Commerce Clause in drafting legislation to protect women from gender-based 
violence. See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 614 (2000) (“§ 13981 is supported by numerous 
findings regarding the serious impact that gender-motivated violence has on victims and their 
families. But the existence of congressional findings is not sufficient, by itself, to sustain the 
constitutionality of Commerce Clause legislation. As we stated in Lopez, ‘[S]imply because Congress 
may conclude that a particular activity substantially affects interstate commerce does not necessarily 
make it so.’ Rather, whether particular operations affect interstate commerce sufficiently to come 
under the constitutional power of Congress to regulate them is ultimately a judicial rather than a 
legislative question, and can be settled finally only by this Court.”) (internal citations omitted). Thus 
the Court’s more recent deference to the Legislature in Gonzales contradicts the Court’s rationale in 
Morrison, and moreover, harkens back to a time in 1948 when “legislative deference” was really the 
Court granting the Legislature permission to enact discriminatory, sex-based classifications without 
fear of any encroaching judicial scrutiny. See Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464, 466–67 (1948) 
(“Michigan may deny to all women opportunities for bartending . . . . This Court is certainly not in a 
position to gainsay such belief by the Michigan legislature. . . .  We cannot cross-examine either 
actually or argumentatively the mind of Michigan legislators nor question their motives.”); See also 
Joshua E. Perry, Partial Birth Biopolitics, 11 DEPAUL J. HEALTH CARE L. 247, 251 (2007) (“Justice 
Kennedy’s rationale signals a biopolitical power shift in decision-making away from a women and 
her physician, and in combination with his deference to ‘legislative competence,’ an alarming 
willingness by the third branch of government to defer to biopolitical regulation of women’s bodies 
by legislative bodies.”). Gonzales, therefore, effectively illustrates how unquestioned deference to the 
Legislature concerning its use of sex-based classifications greatly jeopardizes the Equal Protection of 
women under the law. 
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prejudicial and harmful to women’s ability to participate equally and fully in 
society.17 
Gonzales highlights more than just the discriminatory rationale behind the 
government’s use of abortion regulations. With its approval of an abortion ban 
that leaves out an exception for the health and safety of women,18 Gonzales 
exemplifies the recent collapse of the Due Process Clause’s privacy framework 
and its ultimate failure to protect women’s rights adequately. Most scholars now 
agree: Roe was both wrong and constitutionally weak the day it was decided.19 
Although Roe’s constitutional underpinnings were frail in 1973, today in 2009, it 
is questionable whether they still exist. 
In Washington v. Glucksberg, the Court rejected the very methodology the 
Roe Court employed to justify its conclusion that a fundamental right to abortion 
exists.20 Thus, with the combination of the Court’s decisions in Gonzales and 
Glucksberg, the Court has effectively placed Roe v. Wade and the fundamental 
right to abortion on the endangered constitutional species list. Although the 
Court may never directly overrule Roe, in Glucksberg and subsequently in 
Gonzales, it has already eradicated the constitutional underpinnings upon which 
the Roe Court originally defined a woman’s fundamental right to an abortion. 
Therefore, in response to Gonzales v. Carhart, this article offers the following 
conclusion: Roe v. Wade was flawed the day it was decided. The correct 
constitutional query was never whether a fundamental right to an abortion 
could be derived from the fundamental right to marital privacy the Court 
 
 17. Gonzales, 127 S. Ct. at 1649 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). See also Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7, 
14–15 (1975) (“No longer is the female destined solely for the home and the rearing of the family, 
and only the male for the marketplace and the world of ideas.”); Jack Balkin, Gonzales v. Carhart—
Three Comments, April 18, 2007, available at http://balkin.blogspot.com/2007/04/gonzales-v-carhart-
three-comments.html) (noting that this “new anti-abortion rhetoric attempts to demonstrate that few 
women in their right minds, who really understand what abortion involved, would defy their 
natural love for their children and consent to an abortion, much less seek to procure one. It tries to 
perform a rhetorical jujitsu move on the idea of choice, by suggesting—without any empirical 
evidence, that women don’t really choose abortions, and that to have an abortion is actually a 
violation of their ‘true’ choices.”). 
 18. Gonzales, 127 S. Ct. at 1635–37. 
 19. Whereas many scholars are now criticizing the Court’s reasoning in Roe, many others have 
criticized the decision for decades.  See John Hart Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf: A Comment on Roe v. 
Wade, 82 YALE L.J. 920, 926–27 (1973) (“[Roe] is bad because it is bad constitutional law, or rather 
because it is not constitutional law and gives almost no sense of an obligation to try to be.”). See also 
Jack M. Balkin, Abortion and Original Meaning, 24 CONST. COMMENT. 291, 291 (2008) (“Criticisms of 
Roe have generally proceeded precisely on this ground: the right to sexual privacy is not specifically 
mentioned in the Constitution, and there is no evidence that the framers intended the Constitution to 
protect a woman’s right to abortion.”); Teresa Stanton Collett, The Roberts Court and Equal Protection: 
Gender, Race, and Class Gender, 59 S.C. L. REV. 701, 702 (2008) (“My conclusions compel me to join the 
legions of legal scholars who have sharply criticized the reasoning employed by the Court in Roe v. 
Wade.”); Ginsburg, supra note 11, at 376 (criticizing Roe because the Court “presented an incomplete 
justification for its action.”); Andrew Koppelman, Forced Labor: A Thirteenth Amendment Defense of 
Abortion, 84 NW. U. L. REV. 480, 480 (1990) (noting that the Roe Court did not “ground its decision, 
that abortion is a fundamental right, in the text of the Constitution.”). 
 20. 521 U.S. 702, 703 (1997) (holding that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 
only “protects those fundamental rights and liberties which are, objectively, deeply rooted in this 
Nation's history and tradition.”). 
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defined in Griswold v. Connecticut.21 Instead, the proper question for 
constitutional scrutiny has always been and continues to be: How has the 
government, with the goal of preventing the termination of unborn life created 
by the collective actions of both a woman and a man, imposed regulations that 
require only the woman to sacrifice her freedom, personal autonomy, liberty, 
health, and economic equality to save the life? 
Because the government has historically enacted laws criminalizing 
abortion to preserve traditional stereotypes regarding a woman’s domestic and 
subordinate position in society,22 abortion regulations necessitate an Equal 
Protection Clause analysis. Thus, this article will examine first how Gonzales and 
Glucksberg forecast Roe’s now inevitable demise, and accordingly, why abortion 
regulations must now be evaluated under an Equal Protection Clause analysis—
in place of the crumbling Due Process Clause framework.23 Finally, this article 
will explain how and why the Partial Birth Abortion Act of 2003 violates the 
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
II. WASHINGTON V. GLUCKSBERG: HOW THE COURT’S ADOPTION OF THE HISTORY 
AND TRADITIONS METHODOLOGY HAS ENDANGERED THE RIGHT TO ABORTION 
The biggest threat to the future of a woman’s fundamental right to abortion 
is the now inevitable demise of the rational continuum methodology. To define 
a fundamental right to abortion, the Roe Court relied on Justice Harlan’s rational 
continuum methodology24 to extend the privacy rights previously defined in 
Griswold v. Connecticut25 and Eisenstadt v. Baird26 to include a woman’s right to 
abortion. More recently, in Glucksberg, the Court dismissed Harlan’s rational 
continuum methodology, holding that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment only “protects those fundamental rights and liberties which are, 
objectively, deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition.”27 Because one 
cannot easily argue that a woman’s right to an abortion is “deeply rooted in this 
Nation’s history and traditions,”28 the Glucksberg Court’s implementation of a 
strict history and traditions methodology has undermined Roe’s constitutional 
foundation—placing the continued existence of a fundamental right to abortion 
in great jeopardy. 
 
 21. 381 U.S. 479 (1975). 
 22. Reva Siegel, Reasoning from the Body: A Historical Perspective on Abortion Regulation and 
Questions of Equal Protection, 44 STAN. L. REV. 261, 265 (1992). 
 23. Cf. Scott A. Moss & Douglas M. Raines, The Intriguing Federalist Future of Reproductive Rights, 
88 B.U.L. REV. 175, 178 (2008) (arguing in place of both the Due Process and Equal Protection clauses, 
women’s rights advocates should challenge abortion regulations under the provisions found within 
individual states’ constitutions). 
 24. See infra, note 29, at 168–70. 
 25. 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
 26. 405 U.S. 438 (1972). 
 27. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 703 (1997). 
 28. Id. at 721. 
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A. The Birth of the Rational Continuum Methodology: How Harlan’s Dissent in 
Poe v. Ullman Led to the Conception of a Woman’s Fundamental Right to 
Abortion 
Because the fundamental right to abortion is not an enumerated right, 
found within the text of the Constitution, the Roe Court had to rely on Justice 
Harlan’s “rational continuum methodology” to conclude that the right to 
abortion is “embraced within the personal liberty protected by the Due Process 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.”29 The period preceding Justice Harlan’s 
dissent in Poe was one of great judicial restraint in the area of substantive due 
process. At that time, the Court was hesitant to define new fundamental rights 
that were neither explicitly listed in the Constitution’s text nor commonly 
recognized within this Nation’s traditions.30 Justice Harlan’s understanding of 
substantive due process can thus be seen as a modification of the pre-New Deal 
history and traditions approach, which inquired whether the right in question 
was “so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as 
fundamental.”31 Justice Harlan challenged the Court’s narrow interpretation of 
the Due Process Clause, arguing that the Constitution protects more rights than 
merely those that have been well-recognized throughout this Nation’s 
traditions.32 Arguing that Due Process is not a simple “formula” of history and 
tradition analysis, Justice Harlan asserted that Due Process is instead a question 
of balancing, a sort of “rational continuum”: 
Due Process has not been reduced to any formula; its content cannot be 
determined by reference to any code . . .  The balance of which I speak is the 
balance struck by this country, having regard to what history teaches are the 
traditions from which it developed as well as the traditions from which it broke. 
That tradition is a living thing . . . . It is a rational continuum which, broadly 
speaking, includes a freedom from all substantial arbitrary impositions and 
purposeless restraints.33 
Thus, the Roe Court adopted Justice Harlan’s iteration of the rational 
continuum methodology and broadly interpreted the Constitution as inclusive 
of the fundamental right to abortion.34 Although the Court could not conclude 
that this Nation’s history and traditions directly supported a fundamental right 
to abortion, the Roe Court was able to look to applicable precedents in previous 
 
 29. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 168–70 (1973) (Stewart, J., concurring) (noting that it was the 
Majority’s use of Justice Harlan’s rational continuum methodology that permitted the Court to 
conclude that it “[wa]s correct in holding that the right asserted by Jane Roe is embraced within the 
personal liberty protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.”). 
 30. STEPHEN M. GRIFFIN, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM: FROM THEORY TO POLITICS 170 (1996). 
 31. Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934). 
 32. Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 543 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
 33. Id. (emphasis added). 
 34. See 410 U.S. 113, 169 (1973) (Stewart, J., concurring) (explaining that in deriving a 
fundamental right to abortion, the Court had adopted Justice Harlan’s view that “[t]he full scope of 
the liberty guaranteed by the Due Process Clause cannot be found in or limited by the precise terms 
of the specific guarantees elsewhere provided in the Constitution.”) (quoting Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 
497, 543 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting)). 
Nagle Macro 2.doc 8/3/2009  10:37:45 AM 
 ABORTION POST-GLUCKSBERG AND POST-GONZALES 299 
cases, such as Griswold and Eisenstadt, and derive its own newly defined 
fundamental right to abortion.35 
Roe was certainly not the first, nor the last, Court to rely heavily on Justice 
Harlan’s rational continuum methodology to justify its creation of a new 
fundamental right. In Griswold, Eisenstadt, Roe, and Casey, the Court applied the 
rational continuum methodology to liberty questions dealing with sexuality, 
reproductive decisions, and intimate sexual relations—which the Court 
classified as falling under a broad category of liberty interests concerning the 
fundamental right to privacy.36 During a period in which Harlan’s rational 
continuum methodology controlled the constitutional jurisprudence constituting 
Due Process, the Court used Harlan’s methodology to expand several 
constitutional rights in decisions such as Griswold (defining the right to marital 
privacy), Eisenstadt (extending the right defined in Griswold to unwed singles to 
be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion in the personal decision of 
whether to beget a child)¸ and Casey (reaffirming the Court’s decision in Roe to 
extend the right in Eisenstadt to the right to choose abortion before fetal 
viability).37 During this protracted period, the Court took Justice Harlan’s 
rational continuum methodology to its extreme, focusing almost exclusively on 
evaluating the intrinsic value of the liberty interest (or fundamental right) in 
question, while giving only cursory (if any) consideration of whether this 
Nation’s history and traditions directly supported any of the rights in question.38 
From Griswold in 1965, to Casey in 1992, it was clear that the constitutional 
foundation of the Court’s recognition of a woman’s fundamental right to 
abortion, as derived from her right to autonomy and control over her 
reproductive decisions, was Harlan’s rational continuum methodology.39 In 
Casey, the Court once again cited its adherence to Justice Harlan’s rational 
continuum methodology—rejecting Chief Justice Rehnquist’s insistence that the 
proper methodology was a history and traditions analysis of the right in 
question.40 In an opinion where the only reference to this Nation’s history and 
tradition came in the dissent,41 the majority in Casey held that “the liberty 
protected by the Fourteenth Amendment [includes] the right to define one’s 
own concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of 
human life.”42 
 
 35. Id. at 153. 
 36. See Robert C. Post, Foreword: Fashioning the Legal Constitution: Culture, Courts and Law, 117 
HARV. L. REV. 4, 88 (2002); Laurence H. Tribe, Lawrence v. Texas, the “Fundamental Right” that Dare 
Not Speak its Name, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1893, 1939 (2004). 
 37. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 
113 (1973); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
 38. Post, supra note 36, at 88. 
 39. Casey, 505 U.S. at 848–49 (re-affirming the application of Justice Harlan’s “rational 
continuum” methodology, which the Court first adopted in Griswold v. Connecticut, when the Court 
“held that the Constitution does not permit a State to forbid a married couple to use 
contraceptives.”) (citing Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965)). 
 40. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 940 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); See also GRIFFIN, supra note 30, at 173. 
 41. See Casey, 505 U.S. 951 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
 42. Id. at 851 (majority opinion). 
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B. The Untimely Demise of the Rational Continuum Methodology: How the 
Glucksberg Court’s Strict Implementation of a History and Traditions 
Methodology Has All but Eviscerated Roe v. Wade 
Although Casey may have reaffirmed the Court’s adherence to Harlan’s 
rational continuum methodology in 1992, this affirmation was retracted five 
years later in 1997, when the Court issued its decision in Washington v. 
Glucksberg.43 In Glucksberg, the Court rejected Harlan’s rational continuum 
methodology and instead adopted a strict adherence to the history and 
traditions methodology.44 Through the application of this methodology, the 
Court declined to define a new fundamental right to end one’s own life; instead, 
the Court concluded it could find no evidence of this Nation’s historical and 
traditional recognition of a right to euthanasia.45 The Glucksberg Court, therefore, 
restricted the rights the Due Process Clause protects to only “those fundamental 
rights and liberties which are, objectively, deeply rooted in this Nation’s history 
and tradition.”46 
This strict implementation of the history and traditions methodology has 
threatened the constitutional validity of the Court’s reliance on Harlan’s rational 
continuum methodology to define a fundamental right to abortion in Roe. In 
fact, the Court’s decision in Glucksberg calls into question not only Roe v. Wade, 
but the entire line of Supreme Court precedent built on the rational continuum 
methodology. Griswold, Eisenstadt, Roe, and Casey all exemplify the Court’s 
reliance on a methodology that considers “the traditions from which [this 
country] developed as well as the traditions from which it broke,”47 a 
methodology that is entirely antithetical to the history and traditions 
methodology the Court has now firmly established in Glucksberg. 
In the eleven years since the Court’s ruling in 1997, Glucksberg’s 
jurisprudence has proven to be quite potent. Lower courts have overwhelmingly 
elected to apply Glucskberg’s history and traditions methodology over Harlan’s 
rational continuum when evaluating questions of substantive due process.48 
This is not surprising since Glucksberg’s cogent language leaves no question that 
the history and traditions methodology is the “correct” methodology to apply.49 
Further, it is quite remarkable that, while the Gonzales Court cited Glucksberg 
three times, not once did the Gonzales Court cite to Roe.50 The Court’s decision in 
Gonzales, therefore, now stands as an example of how the Court can use 
Glucksberg to restrict a woman’s right to abortion, since the “narrow, restrained 
approach to substantive due process in Gonzales v. Carhart [. . .] shows that [the] 
 
 43. 521 U.S. 702 (1997). 
 44. Id. at 703. 
 45. Id. at 722–23. 
 46. Id. at 703. 
 47. Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 542 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
 48. See Brian Hawkins, The Glucksberg Renaissance: Substantive Due Process Since Lawrence v. 
Texas, 105 MICH. L. REV. 409, 419–20 (2006). 
 49. See id. 
 50. The Court only cited Roe indirectly, through citations that explained how Casey altered 
Roe’s initial trimester framework. See Gonzales v. Carhart, 127 S. Ct. 1610, 1610, 1617, 1626, 1633 
(2007). 
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Justices have recommitted themselves to the narrow, restrained approach of 
Glucksberg in substantive due process cases.”51 Glucksberg has erased Harlan’s 
rational continuum approach from the substantive due process framework, and 
in turn, has provided lower courts with a methodology that is now easier to 
apply and more predictable in its outcome—a methodology that above all, 
threatens the future of a right to abortion through its advocacy of a higher 
degree of judicial restraint.52 
Glucksberg’s reinstitution of the history and traditions methodology is so 
strict that some scholars have concluded that Glucksberg fundamentally changed 
the course of Due Process altogether.53 Some scholars even questioned whether 
Glucksberg directly overruled the prior Due Process precedents of Griswold, Roe, 
Eisenstadt, and Casey.54 Yet instead of directly overruling cases like Casey and 
Griswold, the Glucksberg Court simply reshaped them to fit within the Glucksberg 
mold.55 While the Court in Casey made no mention of the history and traditions 
methodology (and instead directly quoted Justice Harlan’s dissent in Poe),56 the 
Glucksberg Court practically rewrote Casey, rejecting the notion that Casey was 
based on Harlan’s rational continuum methodology and instead, proclaiming 
that the “Court’s opinion in Casey [. . .] in a general way and in light of [its] prior 
cases[,]” described rights “that [the] Court identified as so deeply rooted in our 
history and traditions.”57 Similarly, the Glucksberg Court took a case like 
Griswold, where the Court held that there was a fundamental right to the use of 
contraceptives based on Justice Harlan’s rational continuum methodology, and 
reframed it as a case that defined a fundamental right to contraceptives based on 
the longstanding history and tradition of rights older “than the Bill of Rights.”58 
Thus, although Glucksberg embodies the antithesis of Justice Harlan’s rational 
continuum methodology as applied in Griswold, Eisenstadt, Roe, and Casey, 
Glucksberg did not directly overrule that specific line of Court precedent. Instead, 
Glucksberg merely rewrote the history of substantive due process law—writing a 
new history that tells a story of an almost exclusive reliance on the history and 
traditions methodology—and effectively excludes the story of the Court’s earlier 
adoption of the rational continuum from Justice Harlan’s dissent in Poe.59 
 
 51. Steven G. Calabresi, Substantive Due Process After Gonzales v. Carhart, 106 MICH. L. REV. 
1517, 1518 (2008). 
 52. See id. at 1520 (“Gonzales is a pro-judicial restraint, anti-substantive due process decision.”); 
Post, supra note 36, at 92. 
 53. Post, supra note 36, at 93 (“By collapsing substantive due process into a question of historical 
fact, Glucksberg transformed the Court from an institution engaged in cultural judgments into an 
institution that enforced the cultural judgments of others.”). 
 54. See Tribe, supra note 36, at 1894. See also Cass R. Sunstein, What Did Lawrence Hold? Of 
Autonomy, Desuetude, Sexuality, and Marriage, 55 SUP. CT. REV. 27, 39 (2003) (arguing that Glucksberg’s 
strict adherence to the history and traditions methodology does not support many of the rights 
defined in the Court’s line of privacy cases). 
 55. See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 727 & n.19 (1997). 
 56. Casey v. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa., 505 U.S. 833, 848–49 (1992) (citing Poe v. 
Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 543 (1961)). 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. 
 59. See Post, supra note 36, at 92. 
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In a post-Glucksberg, post-Gonzales world, a woman’s right to abortion is no 
longer secure under the Due Process Clause. Instead, women’s rights advocates 
need to move their legal discourse out from under the collapsing substantive 
due process framework, and begin to argue what has been true all along: current 
abortion regulations are sex-based classifications that violate the Equal 
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
III. GONZALES V. CARHART: HOW THE PARTIAL BIRTH ABORTION ACT VIOLATES THE 
EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 
Man is, or should be, woman’s protector and defender. . .  The paramount 
destiny and mission of woman are to fulfill the noble and benign offices of wife 
and mother. This is the law of the Creator.60 
The ability of women to participate equally in the economic and social life of the 
Nation has been facilitated by their ability to control their reproductive lives.61 
Respect for human life finds an ultimate expression in the bond of love the 
mother has for her child.62 
The Partial Birth Abortion Act of 2003 violates the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause. The Act constitutes a sex-based 
classification, and the government has failed to put forth an “exceedingly 
persuasive justification” that “show[s] at least that the classification serves 
important governmental objectives and that the discriminatory means employed 
are substantially related to the achievement of those objectives.”63 Although the 
Court has yet to scrutinize abortion laws within the Equal Protection Clause 
framework, the Gonzales Court’s consideration of the “bond of love the mother 
has for her child”64 as a legitimate rationale for constitutional analysis provides 
compelling evidence that current abortion regulations should be analyzed under 
the Equal Protection Clause—not the Due Process Clause. The Gonzales Court’s 
own justification for its ruling would not pass constitutional muster under 
United States v. Virginia’s “exceedingly persuasive justification” test for sex-
based classifications.65 
A. The Partial Birth Abortion Act of 2003 Constitutes a Sex-Based Classification 
The Partial Birth Abortion Act of 2003 is a sex-based classification because 
it singles out women for special governmental treatment66 that “closes a door or 
 
 60. Bradwell v. State of Illinois, 83 U.S. 130, 141 (1872)(Bradley, J., concurring). 
 61. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 835 (1992) (emphasis 
added). 
 62. Gonzales v. Carhart, 127 S. Ct. 1610, 1634 (2007). 
 63. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 524 (1996) (internal quotations omitted). 
 64. Gonzales v. Carhart, 127 S. Ct. 1610, 1634 (2007). 
 65. See infra notes 109–148. 
 66. See supra note 7. 
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denies opportunity to women.”67 Accepting the argument that life begins 
immediately at conception (or even fertilization), the government is forcing 
women to sacrifice their freedom, personal autonomy, liberty, health, and 
economic equality to save the life of another. At no other time, and in no other 
analogous circumstances, does the government ever require men to sacrifice 
their freedom, personal autonomy, liberty, health, or economic equality to save 
the life of another. 
Both the body of a man and a woman are required to create the new life the 
government seeks to protect. The government, however, has elected to regulate 
the life and liberty of only one of the two sexes that are required for the creation 
of the new life. Although it is true that only women are equipped with the 
necessary organs that create a state of pregnancy,68 this physical reality does not 
grant the government the constitutional privilege of “tak[ing] a characteristic 
limited to one group of citizens and turn[ing] that characteristic into a source of 
social disadvantage.”69 The Fourteenth Amendment is not blind to the 
government’s manipulation of a suspect class’s physical anomaly from the norm 
as a basis for discriminating against that class. Instead, this is just the sort of 
discrimination the Fourteenth Amendment subjects to constitutional scrutiny.70 
Similarly, it is true that no unwanted pregnancy could ever be created 
without the sperm of a man. The government, however, could not justify the 
equality of a law that regulates only the extra-marital intimate sexual relations of 
men on the basis that only men are physically capable of producing the sperm 
that are necessary to create unwanted pregnancies.71 It is quite conceivable that 
if the government could regulate men’s extra-marital sexual relations, there 
would be fewer abortions in the United States. Like the government’s regulation 
of abortion, this sort of discretionary discrimination amounts to a sex-based 
 
 67. Virginia, 518 U.S. at 532.  See also Bray v. Alexandria Women's Health Clinic, 506 U.S. 263, 
323 (1993) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“A classification is sex based if it classifies on the basis of sex. As 
the capacity to become pregnant is a characteristic necessarily associated with one sex, a 
classification based on the capacity to become pregnant is a classification based on sex.”); Balkin, 
supra note 19, at 324 (“Laws that force women to become mothers against their will help maintain 
the unequal and subordinate status of women in society because they help commit women, against 
their will, to lives of domestic labor and economic dependency.”). 
 68. Reva Siegel has acknowledged that the reasoning that abortion regulations do not constitute 
sex-based classifications because only women can become pregnant is a flawed application of race 
discrimination doctrine to sex discrimination doctrine. See Reva Siegel, She The People: The Nineteenth 
Amendment, Sex Equality, Federalism, and the Family, 115 HARV. L. REV. 947, 1025 (2002) (“Fashioned in 
the image of race discrimination doctrine, the law of sex discrimination . . . [fails] to understand how 
the state enforces status relations through the regulation of practices that are primarily or exclusively 
performed by members of one group.”). 
 69. Sunstein, supra note 11, at 24–25. 
 70. The Court’s decision in Casey, while based on substantive due process grounds, contains 
language that provides strong support for this interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause. See 
Casey v. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa., 505 U.S. 833, 852 (1992) (“That these sacrifices 
have from the beginning of the human race been endured by woman with a pride that ennobles her 
in the eyes of others and gives to the infant a bond of love cannot alone be grounds for the State to 
insist she make the sacrifice.”). 
 71. See Cass Sunstein, Neutrality in Constitutional Law, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 31–32 (1992) 
(Arguing that abortion regulations “selectively turn women's reproductive capacities into something 
for the use and control of others. No parallel disability is imposed on men.”). 
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classification that warrants constitutional review under the Fourteenth 
Amendment. 
Furthermore, while saving unborn life and preventing the abortion of 
unwanted pregnancies are certainly laudable goals (and arguably qualify as 
compelling governmental objectives), that does not excuse the government’s use 
of discriminatory means from the requisite constitutional scrutiny that must be 
applied to all sex-based classifications.72 When a government’s law or regulation 
utilizes one of the Fourteenth Amendment’s enumerated suspect classifications, 
the Court must apply the appropriate level of constitutional scrutiny—even if 
the government contends that its intentions are benign.73 Because legislatures 
have historically disguised harmful, sex-based discriminatory laws with 
proclaimed “benign” intentions,74 the Court has adopted “a strong presumption 
that gender classifications are invalid.”75 If a government wishes to classify 
based on sex or gender, its use of discriminatory means must pass “the test for 
determining the validity of a gender-based classification.”76 This constitutional 
scrutiny “is straightforward [and] must be applied free of fixed notions 
concerning the roles and abilities of males and females.”77 
B. Virginia’s Exceedingly Persuasive Justification Standard 
Because the Partial Birth Abortion Act of 2003 is a sex-based classification,78 
the government has the burden of demonstrating that the regulation passes the 
constitutional scrutiny of Virginia’s heightened exceedingly persuasive 
justification standard. Accordingly, the government must show that its use of a 
sex-based “classification serves important governmental objectives and that the 
discriminatory means employed are substantially related to the achievement of 
those objectives.”79 This “burden of justification is demanding and it rests 
entirely on the State.”80 
This standard is, in effect, more demanding than the ordinary standard of 
review corresponding with the Court’s application of an intermediate level of 
scrutiny. In Virginia, the Court took the exceedingly persuasive justification 
 
 72. See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 485 U.S. 265, 299 (1978) (“Political judgments 
regarding the necessity for the particular classification may be weighed in the constitutional balance, 
but the standard of justification will remain constant.”) (citations omitted). 
 73. Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 724, n.9 (1982) (“Our past decisions 
establish, however, that when a classification expressly discriminates on the basis of gender, the 
analysis and level of scrutiny applied to determine the validity of the classification do not vary 
simply because the objective appears acceptable to individual Members of the Court. While the 
validity and importance of the objective may affect the outcome of the analysis, the analysis itself 
does not change.”). 
 74. Reva Siegel, supra note 22, at 265. 
 75. See J.E.B. v. Ala. ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 152 (1994) (Kennedy, J., concurring); United States 
v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 531 (1996) (explaining that the Court’s “skeptical scrutiny of official action 
denying rights or opportunities based on sex responds to volumes of history.”). 
 76. Hogan, 458 U.S. at 724–25. 
 77. Id. 
 78. See supra, note 8. 
 79. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 524 (1996). 
 80. Id. at 533. 
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standard the Court first expounded in Personnel Administrator of Massachusetts 
v. Feeney81 and greatly expanded its scope—resulting in an intermediate scrutiny 
standard that more closely resembles the “strict” level of scrutiny the Court 
reserves for race classifications.82 The Virginia Court strengthened the standard 
of review for sex-based classifications by incorporating into its analysis an 
examination of the authenticity of the government’s asserted objective—
successfully rooting out those proclaimed governmental interests that only serve 
as a pretext for other, more discriminatory objectives.83 Furthermore, the Virginia 
Court modified the sex-based classification standard of review to also evaluate 
the efficacy of the government’s selective use of the sex-classification as its 
means to achieve the compelling governmental interest.84 
Thus by writing a standard of review that analyzes both the authenticity of 
the government’s asserted interest as well as the efficacy of the government’s 
selected means, the Court effectively engendered a new species in the 
heightened standard of review category for sex-based classifications: the Virginia 
exceedingly persuasive justification standard.85 
Under this stricter standard of heightened scrutiny, the Virginia Court first 
analyzed the government’s proffered interest in maintaining the Virginia 
Military Institute (VMI) as a male-sex only institution of higher education, 
scrutinizing the governmental action for a “close resemblance between ‘the 
alleged objective’ and ‘the actual purpose underlying the discriminatory 
classification.’”86 Although Virginia claimed its governmental objective was 
diversity in higher education, the Court was quick to note that “[n]either recent 
nor distant history bears out Virginia’s alleged pursuit of diversity through 
single-sex educational options.”87 
In dispensing with the government’s alleged objective, the Court reviewed 
the evidence before it and concluded that diversity in higher education was not 
the original reason Virginia created VMI as a male-sex only institution in 1839.88 
The Court noted that in 1839, Virginia created VMI out of a governmental 
concern that “[h]igher education at the time was considered dangerous for 
women[,] reflecting widely held views about women’s proper place” in 
society—views the Court now considers to be unconstitutional as a rationale for 
 
 81. 442 U.S. 256, 273 (1979) (holding that past “precedents dictate that any state law overtly or 
covertly designed to prefer males over females . . . would require an exceedingly persuasive 
justification to withstand a constitutional challenge under the Equal Protection Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.”) (emphasis added). 
 82. Virginia, 518 U.S. at 545 (“The Commonwealth's justification for excluding all women from 
‘citizen-soldier’ training for which some are qualified, in any event, cannot rank as ‘exceedingly 
persuasive,’ as we have explained and applied that standard.”). 
 83. Id. at 536. 
 84. Id. at 546. 
 85. See Lawrence G. Sager, Of Tiers of Scrutiny and Time Travel: A Reply to Dean Sullivan, 90 CAL. 
L. REV. 819, 821 (2002) (“Ginsburg’s surprisingly uncelebrated opinion in the VMI case is splendid.  
It carries, I believe, the seeds of radical and very important doctrinal change.”). 
 86. Virginia, 518 U.S. at 536 (quoting Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 728 (1982)). 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. 
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the government’s use of a sex-based classification.89 The Court concluded that 
“[t]he [government’s] justification must be genuine, not hypothesized or 
invented post hoc in response to litigation. And it must not rely on overbroad 
generalizations about the different talents, capacities, or preferences of males 
and females.”90 
In comparison to the Due Process framework of Glucksberg and Gonzales—
which merely inquires whether the government has a compelling interest—the 
Virginia Court’s application of the Equal Protection framework provides more 
sound constitutional protection to women as a suspect class, since it examines 
the authenticity of the government’s proclaimed interest for any disguised 
discriminatory intent.91 The Virginia Court justified this more demanding review 
of the government’s objective, reasoning that the Equal Protection Clause must 
prevent “state actors [from] rely[ing] on ‘overbroad’ generalizations to make 
‘judgments about people that are likely to . . . perpetuate historical patterns of 
discrimination.’”92 As the Court explained, “justifications proffered in defense of 
categorical exclusions will not be accepted automatically; a tenable justification 
must describe actual state purposes, not rationalizations for actions in facts 
differently grounded.”93 Consequently, for women who have historically been 
subjected to discriminatory laws predicated upon “overbroad 
generalizations . . . about people,”94 the Equal Protection Clause offers a more 
secure constitutional shelter than the Due Process Clause. 
Furthermore, the Virginia Court’s elucidation of its exceedingly persuasive 
justification standard further heightened the Court’s “intermediate” scrutiny of 
sex-based classifications through an evaluation of the efficacy of the means the 
government had selected to achieve its interest.95 This evaluation requires the 
government’s use of a sex-based classification to “substantially advance” the 
government’s stated compelling interest.96 After examining the means the 
government had selected to achieve its goal of achieving diversity in higher 
education, the Court determined that “[a] purpose genuinely to advance an 
array of educational options is not served by VMI’s historic and constant 
plan.”97 The fact that Virginia’s use of a sex-based classification did not 
“substantially advance” the government’s alleged compelling interest further 
justified the Court’s dismissal of the government’s use of its sex-based 
classification. As a result of this analysis, the Virginia Court successfully 
 
 89. Id. at 536–37. 
 90. Id. at 532. 
 91. See Sager, supra note 85, at 822 (noting that Virginia’s “requirement of an exceedingly 
persuasive justification calls for a hard judicial look of a special sort: it demands an explanation of 
why a particular law does not implicate those deep constitutional vices normally associated with 
such laws.”). 
 92. Virginia, 518 U.S. at 541–42. 
 93. Id. at 535–36. 
 94. Id. at 541–42. 
 95. Id. at 545–46 (“Just as surely, the Commonwealth's great goal is not substantially advanced 
by women's categorical exclusion, in total disregard of their individual merit, from the 
Commonwealth's premier ‘citizen-soldier’ corps.”). 
 96. Id. at 546. 
 97. Id. at 539–40. 
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incorporated the efficacy of the government’s use of a sex-based classification 
into the constitutional analysis under the Court’s heightened standard of 
review. 
The Virginia Court reasoned that this strengthening of the review for sex-
based classifications was warranted, given this Nation’s “long and unfortunate 
history of sex discrimination”—a history of governmental action that has 
consistently prevented women from entering the political sphere by limiting 
their role in society to the domestic sphere.98 Justice Ginsburg, writing for the 
Virginia Court, noted that historically sex-based classifications have operated to 
disenfranchise women from the democratic process, highlighting the fact that 
women were not considered a part of “We the People” until the passage of the 
Nineteenth Amendment in 1920.99 
The Virginia Court’s historical analysis reveals the true necessity of a 
stricter standard of heightened review for sex-based classifications.100 Whereas 
sex-based classifications have historically operated to prohibit women from 
participating in the political process, their proponents have predicated the 
advocacy of such classifications on moral or domestic-based arguments 
concerning a woman’s role in the family and the need to preserve the family as 
an institution.101 As Justice Ginsburg noted in Virginia, revered constitutional 
Founders such as Thomas Jefferson argued for the government’s use of sex-
based classifications based on the “moral” argument that to “prevent 
depravation of morals and ambiguity of issue, [women] could not [be permitted 
to] mix promiscuously in the public meetings of men.”102 In 1872, Justice Bradley 
acknowledged and adopted the prevailing acceptance of this “moral” reasoning 
to support the government’s use of sex-based classifications, reasoning that “the 
harmony, not to say identity, of interest and views which belong, or should 
 
 98. Id. at 529–32 (quoting Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 684 (1973)). 
 99. Id. at 531–32. See Siegel, supra note 68, at 975–76 (quoting CARRIE CHAPMAN CATT & NETTIE 
ROGERS SHULER, WOMAN SUFFRAGE AND POLITICS 107 (1923)) (“To get the word male . . . out of the 
constitution cost the women of the country fifty-two years of pauseless campaign . . . During that 
time they were forced to conduct fifty-six campaigns of referenda to male voters; 490 campaigns to 
urge Legislatures to submit suffrage amendments to voters; 47 campaigns to induce State 
constitutional conventions to write woman suffrage into State constitutions; 277 campaigns to 
persuade State party conventions to include woman suffrage planks; 30 campaigns to urge 
presidential party conventions to adopt woman suffrage planks in party platforms, and 19 
campaigns with 19 successive Congresses.”) (internal quotations omitted). 
 100. See United States v. Carolene Products, 304 U.S. 144, 152–53, n. 4 (1938) (“[P]rejudice against 
discrete and insular minorities may be a special condition, which tends seriously to curtail the 
operation of those political processes ordinarily to be relied upon to protect minorities, and which 
may call for a correspondingly more searching judicial inquiry”); J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 
75–77 (1980). 
 101. Reva Siegel argues for a higher degree of scrutiny for sex-based classifications based on a 
“synthetic interpretation” of both the Fourteenth and Nineteenth Amendments. Siegel, supra note 68, 
at 1044 (quoting United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 534 (1996) (“Specifically, sex discrimination 
doctrine grounded in a synthetic interpretation of the Fourteenth and Nineteenth Amendments, and 
in an understanding of the history of the woman suffrage campaign, might accord heightened 
scrutiny to state action regulating the family that denies women ‘full citizenship stature’ or that 
perpetuates the ‘legal, social, and economic inferiority of women.’”). 
 102. Virginia, 518 U.S. at 532 (quoting Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Samuel Kercheval (Sept. 5, 
1816), in 10 WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 45–46, n. 1 (P. Ford ed. 1899)). 
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belong, to the family institution is repugnant to the idea of a woman adopting a 
distinct and independent career from that of her husband.”103 Furthermore, 
many who opposed the Nineteenth Amendment argued that women did not 
need the right to vote since they could rely on their husbands for virtual 
representation.104 Extending the vote to women, opponents argued, would 
disrupt the sacred institution of the family by introducing politics into the 
home—creating a significant potential for domestic discord should the woman 
ever decide to use her newfound political independence to disagree with her 
husband.105 For the opponents of women’s suffrage, the preservation of the 
“institution of marriage lay at [the] heart” of their opposition.106 
Thus, the government’s use of a sex-based classification to preserve 
women’s societal role as Mother and to preserve the integrity of the family as an 
institution is not a new development. Instead, for centuries lawmakers have 
utilized sex-based classifications to perpetuate gender inequality in this country, 
and consequently, government actions that utilize sex-based classifications, such 
as abortion regulations, necessitate the application of the Equal Protection 
Clause—not the indiscriminate Due Process Clause. In this Nation, laws and 
regulations predicated on prejudicial views concerning a woman’s proper place 
in society have so thwarted women’s ability to participate in the democratic 
process that those “who seek to defend gender-based government action must 
demonstrate an ‘exceedingly persuasive justification’ for that action.”107 Under 
this exceedingly persuasive justification standard, the government’s use of a sex-
based classification will be analyzed for pretext, and the government will be 
required to demonstrate that its use of the classification actually achieves its 
alleged purpose. 
1. The Partial Birth Abortion Act of 2003 Does Not Pass Constitutional 
Muster Under the Exceedingly Persuasive Justification Standard’s Analysis for 
Pretext 
 
The government’s use of a sex-based classification in the Act fails the 
exceedingly persuasive justification standard’s examination for pretext. The 
government’s use of a sex-based classification fails because “[n]either recent nor 
distant history bears out [the government’s] alleged pursuit of [preventing the 
termination of unwanted pregnancies] through”108 its use of discriminatory 
abortion regulations. Like Virginia’s asserted interest in diversity for higher 
 
 103. Bradwell v. State of Illinois, 16 Wall. 130, 141 (1873) (Bradley, J., concurring)). 
 104. Siegel, supra note 68, at 980. 
 105. See id. at 986 (“Such objections notwithstanding, the virtual representation argument 
remained the core of the antisuffrage case . . . . Unmarried women were assumed to depend on male 
relatives for representation.”). 
 106. Id. 
 107. Virginia, 518 U.S. at 531. 
 108. See id. at 536. 
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education,109 the government’s asserted interest in protecting unborn life 
operates as a pretext that masks the original, discriminatory purpose behind the 
government’s creation of abortion regulations. The government’s alleged benign 
interest in protecting unborn life110 is marred by the fact that “[t]hose who 
advocated restricting women’s access to abortion in the nineteenth century were 
interested in enforcing women’s roles, an objective they justified with arguments 
concerning women’s bodies.”111 
Closer scrutiny reveals that the government’s proffered justification is not 
genuine, but rather, displays an unconstitutional “rel[iance] on overbroad 
generalizations about the different talents, capacities, or preferences of males 
and females.”112 When the government first began regulating women’s 
reproductive rights in the nineteenth century, the criminalization of abortion 
and birth control “functioned as a method of enforcing marital roles” of women 
as wives and mothers—at a time when women were using abortion as a means 
to achieve greater political and economic independence from their domestic 
roles in the home.113 Before 1820, no government in this country (state or federal) 
had criminalized any act of abortion.114 From 1821 to 1841, ten states and one 
federal territory enacted various laws criminalizing abortion.115 Between 1860 
and 1880 more than “[forty] anti-abortion statutes of various kinds were placed 
upon state and territorial lawbooks.”116 
This surge in anti-abortion legislation, however, did not take place in a 
vacuum. Instead, this legislation was the result of a successful national anti-
abortion campaign whose advocates viewed abortion as “a wife’s rejection of 
her traditional role as housekeeper and child raiser.”117 As women began to 
acquire political independence and a measure of equality in society, women 
realized that having fewer children in the home allowed them more 
opportunities to participate in society outside of the home.118 Because the 
majority of husbands did not support their wives’ efforts to become politically 
independent actors outside of the home, abortion became an effective tool 
women could use to liberate themselves from their historical confinement to the 
household—a tool that could “be practiced without the man’s knowledge.”119 
 
 109. Virginia argued unsuccessfully that its sex-based classification achieved diversity in higher 
education. Id. at 535 (“Virginia has not shown that VMI was established, or has been maintained, 
with a view to diversifying, by its categorical exclusion of women, educational opportunities within 
the Commonwealth.”). 
 110. See Gonzales v. Carhart, 127 S. Ct. 1610, 1626 (2007) (considering “the legitimate interest of 
the Government in protecting the life of the fetus that may become a child.”). 
 111. Reva Siegel, supra note 22, at 265. 
 112. Virginia, 515 U.S. at 532; JAMES C. MOHR, ABORTION IN AMERICA: THE ORIGINS AND 
EVOLUTION OF NATIONAL POLICY 103 (1978). 
 113. Siegel, supra note 23, at 318; MOHR, supra note 112, at 105. 
 114. MOHR, supra note 112, at 20. 
 115. Id. 
 116. Id. at 200. 
 117. Id. at 108. 
 118. Id. at 107–08. 
 119. Id. at 103 (“A number of physicians . . . certainly believed that one of the keys to the upsurge 
of abortion was the fact that it was uniquely a female practice, which men could neither control nor 
prevent.”). 
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For the first time in this Nation’s history, birthrates dropped dramatically.120 
“The steepest decennial drop in this long decline . . . occurred between 1840 and 
1850, exactly when abortion information, abortion services, and abortion itself 
came out into the open.”121 At a time when other forms of birth control required 
the unobtainable consent of an unwilling husband,122 women in the mid-
nineteenth century turned to abortion as their gateway out of the home and into 
political society. 
Men, however, did not sit idly by as birthrates dropped and middle-class, 
white Protestant women began to enter political society in mass numbers.123 
Instead, they organized an effective national anti-abortion campaign that 
resulted in scores of anti-abortion statutes in several states.124 The most vocal 
and active members of this campaign were “regular physicians [who] were 
among the most defensive groups in the country on the subject of changing 
traditional sex roles.”125 In addition to seeking to prevent women from divorcing 
their traditional societal roles as mothers, physicians in the nineteenth century 
medical community sought to abdicate “the birthing process from midwives, 
and [. . .] prevent women from entering the medical profession.”126 By asking 
state legislatures to criminalize abortion across the country, physicians were 
literally asking the government to “deploy its sanctions against their 
competitors.”127 To win this male monopoly over the medical profession, 
physicians in the American Medical Association spread propaganda across the 
country averring that abortion was ‘“decimating the human family.’”128 
Thus, the original objective behind the creation of abortion regulations was 
not to protect unborn life, but rather, to prevent women’s entry into the medical 
profession and ensure the perpetuation of stereotyped gender norms, such as 
the wife’s “duty to bear children which she owed, not to her husband, but to the 
community.”129 The Partial Birth Abortion Act, therefore, fails to pass 
constitutional muster as there is no “close resemblance between ‘the alleged 
objective’ and ‘the actual purpose underlying the discriminatory 
classification.’”130 
 
 120. Id. at 102 (“In 1810 there were 1358 children under the age of 5 for every 1000 white women 
of childbearing age in the United States. . . . By 1895 that figure had fallen to a moderate 685 children 
per 1000 women. Put differently, the average American woman bore 7.04 children in 1800; 3.65 by 
1900.”). 
 121. Id. at 83. 
 122. Id. at 107–08. 
 123. See id. at 102 (noting that for the first time, “abortion became highly visible, much more 
frequently practiced, and quite common as a means of family limitation among white, Protestant, 
native-born wives of middle- and upper-class standing.”). 
 124. See supra notes 114–116and accompanying text. 
 125. MOHR, supra note 112, at 168. 
 126. Siegel, supra note 22, at 300. 
 127. MOHR, supra note 112, at 160. 
 128. Id. at 75 (quoting D.A. O’Donnell and W. L. Atlee, “Report of the Committee on Criminal 
Abortion,” Transactions of the American Medical Association, XXII (1871), 250–51). 
 129. Siegel, supra note 22, at 296–97 (internal citations omitted). 
 130. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 536 (1996) (quoting Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 
458 U.S. 718, 728 (1982)). 
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The Gonzales Court’s most recent scrutiny of the constitutionality of an 
abortion regulation under the Due Process Clause only further supports this 
conclusion. Although the government today claims its compelling interest is the 
protection of unborn life,131 the Gonzales Court’s own rhetoric effectively reveals 
that the use of abortion regulations to perpetuate traditional sex-stereotypes has 
hardly changed in the last 150 years.132 Notably, the Gonzales Court justified its 
decision to uphold the constitutionality of the Act’s abortion regulation based on 
the Court’s view that “[re]spect for human life finds an ultimate expression in 
the bond of love the mother has for her child.”133 The Gonzales Court further 
justified its decision by reasoning that “[i]t is self-evident that a mother who 
comes to regret her choice to abort must struggle with grief more anguished and 
sorrow more profound.”134 Thus, the Gonzales Court has effectively held that a 
woman who obtains an abortion suffers profound anguish because she has 
failed her ultimate societal role as a mother. 
The Court, however, has rejected the idea that any biological difference 
exists between a man and a woman to justify the government’s disparate 
treatment of the two sexes’ roles, duties, or benefits involved in parenting. In 
Caban v. Mohammed, the Court rejected “the claim that [a] broad, gender-based 
distinction . . . is required by any universal difference between maternal and 
paternal relations.”135 The Court’s rejection of “any universal difference between 
maternal and paternal relations” reveals the unconstitutional stature of the 
government’s “rel[iance] on overbroad generalizations about the different 
talents, capacities, or preferences of males and females”136 in their capacity as 
parents. Consequently, the Gonzales Court’s preoccupation with preserving a 
woman’s traditional role as “mother” as the “ultimate expression” of “respect 
for human life” reflects nothing more than the true discriminatory and 
unconstitutional objective that persists and pervades lawmakers’ contemporary 
regulation of abortion.137 The Partial Birth Abortion Act of 2003, therefore, does 
not survive the constitutional scrutiny of the exceedingly persuasive justification 
standard. 
2. The Partial Birth Abortion Act of 2003 Does Not Pass Constitutional 
Muster Under the Exceedingly Persuasive Justification Standard’s Efficacy 
Analysis 
 
 131. Gonzales v. Carhart, 127 S. Ct. 1610, 1626–27 (2007). 
 132. See Siegel, supra note 22, at 265 (discussing the discriminatory reasons concerning why 
legislatures enacted abortion regulations). C.f. Gonzales v. Carhart, 127 S. Ct. 1610, 1634 (2007) 
(internal citations omitted) (“While we find no reliable data to measure the phenomenon, it Seems 
unexceptionable to conclude some women come to regret their choice to abort the infant life they 
once created and sustained.  Severe depression and loss of esteem can follow.”). 
 133. Gonzales, 127 S. Ct. at 1634. 
 134. Id. Notably, the American Psychology Association conducted a thorough examination of the 
various studies that have examined the psychological effects of abortion on women’s health and 
concluded that abortion does not adversely affect women’s mental health. See APA Task Force on 
Mental Health and Abortion, Report of the APA Task Force on Mental Health and Abortion, Aug. 13, 
2008, available at http://www.apa.org/releases/abortion-report.html). 
 135. Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 388–89 (1979) (internal citations omitted). 
 136. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 532 (1996). 
 137. Gonzales, 127 S .Ct. at 1617. 
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Furthermore, the Act does not survive the judicial scrutiny of the 
exceedingly persuasive justification standard because the government’s 
regulation of abortion fails to “substantially advance” the government’s “great 
goal” of preventing the termination of unwanted pregnancies.138  In Virginia, the 
Court concluded that “the Commonwealth’s great goal is not substantially 
advanced by women’s categorical exclusion,” and consequently, the Court held 
that “Virginia, in sum, has fallen far short of establishing the exceedingly 
persuasive justification that must be the solid base for any gender-defined 
classification.”139 Likewise, the efficacy of the government’s use of abortion 
regulations is questionable, at best. However, when it comes to the 
government’s use of a prohibited sex-based classification, questionable efficacy 
does not satisfy the constitutional requirements of the exceedingly persuasive 
justification standard. Instead, the government bears the burden of proving that 
its prohibited use of a sex-based classification substantially advances the 
government’s objective to protect unborn life.140 This “burden of justification is 
demanding and it rests entirely on the State.”141 
No conclusive evidence exists to substantiate the success of abortion 
regulations in reducing the number of abortions and protecting unborn life.142 
This is likely because the government’s use of a sex-based classification in its 
regulation of abortion completely fails to address the underlying causes of 
unwanted pregnancies and resulting abortions. Abortions do not occur in a 
vacuum, as the Court’s deficient reasoning in Gonzales seems to suggest. Instead, 
most contemporary abortions are the result of this Nation’s failed economic and 
social policies that have left many women in such a precarious socio-economic 
state that the decision to terminate their pregnancy becomes one of economic 
survival.143 “In 2000, women with resources below the federal poverty level 
 
 138. Virginia, 518 U.S. at 546. 
 139. Id. at 546. 
 140. Id. at 531–32. 
 141. Id. 
 142. See John M. Breen, Modesty and Moralism: Justice, Prudence, and Abortion—A Reply to Skeel & 
Stuntz, 31 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL. 219, 295 (2008). 
 143. See APA Task Force on Mental Health and Abortion, supra note 134, at 293 (“Among women 
who have had abortions, the available data has consistently shown that financial considerations do 
indeed play a role in the decision to abort. In 2004, researchers at the Guttmacher Institute conducted 
a structured survey of over 1,100 women who had recently obtained abortions. Significantly, 73 
percent of respondents listed ‘[c]an’t afford a baby now’ as one of their reasons for choosing the 
procedure.  A similar study conducted in 1987 revealed similar financial concerns. In this earlier 
survey, 68 percent of the 1,900 participating women indicated that their inability to afford a child 
was a factor in their decision to abort.  In addition, both of these studies reveal that the inability to 
afford a child was of great importance relative to other factors. The 2004 study reported that 23 
percent of participating women listed financial constraints as the most important reason for Seeking 
an abortion, and the 1987 study indicated that 21 percent listed this factor as the most important.  
Indeed, in the 2004 study, only one reason to abort ranked ahead of financial concern. That is, 25 
percent of the women surveyed responded they were ‘not ready’ for a child, or another child, or that 
the timing of the pregnancy was ‘wrong.’”). 
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constituted 57% of all abortions.”144 Clearly one effective way to reduce the 
number of abortions in this country would be to combat the poverty many 
pregnant women face. In fact, studies show that countries that implement public 
assistance programs to reduce poverty have lower rates of abortion than 
countries that merely criminalize abortion.145 Further, studies have shown that 
better access to contraceptives and more effective sex education programs serve 
to lower the number of unwanted pregnancies, thereby lowering the number of 
abortions.146 But the government has chosen not to pursue any of these 
alternative means—despite the fact that they would provide for a more effective 
reduction in the number of abortions in this country. 
The fact that the government’s use of a sex-based classification constitutes 
one of the least effective means to prevent the termination of unborn life only 
further serves to discredit the government’s claim that protection of unborn life 
is its true, original purpose. The available evidence indicates that the root causes 
of abortion are the lack of reproductive health care for women, the poverty 
pregnant women face, the sexual and physical abuse of women, and the 
rampant abandonment of pregnant women by the unborn child’s male father.147 
Instead of implementing a policy that resolves any of these underlying causes, 
the government has elected to use a discriminatory sex-based classification. The 
fact that the government’s use of a sex-based classification fails to substantially 
advance its own compelling objective renders its regulation of abortion 
unconstitutional. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Gonzales stands as an example of how certain discriminatory laws can pass 
constitutional muster when they are incorrectly analyzed under the Due Process 
 
 144. Id. at 20–21(citations omitted). See also id. at 15 (“According to the 2000 Census data, African 
American women are more than three times as likely as White women to have an abortion (Dugger, 
1998). Latinas are approximately two times as likely as White women to have an abortion, although 
there are important subgroup differences.  . . . The overrepresentation of ethnic minority women 
among those who obtain abortions in the United States may represent the general problem of greater 
poverty and reduced access to health care, including reproductive health services, among women of 
color.”). 
 145. See id. at 295 (“The incidence of abortion in countries that provide greater public assistance 
to women facing unwanted pregnancies than the United States appears to confirm the inability of 
non-coercive methods to significantly reduce the number of abortions. For example, a 1999 study, 
also sponsored by the Guttmacher Institute, reported the frequency of abortion in fifty-nine 
countries with populations of at least one million where abortion is legal and generally available.  
For each country, the study included three important statistics: the actual number of reported 
abortions within a given year; the ‘abortion rate,’ that is, the number of abortions per 1,000 women 
ages 15 to 44; and the ‘abortion ratio,’ that is, the number of abortions per 100 known pregnancies. 
Thus, for 1996, the study reported that 1,365,700 abortions were performed in the United States. This 
means in that year, for every 1,000 women of childbearing age, 22.9 had an abortion, and a 
staggering 25.9 percent of all known pregnancies were terminated by abortion.”). 
 146. Jack M. Balkin, supra note 6, at 5. 
 147. See APA Task Force on Mental Health and Abortion, supra note 134, at 293. 
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Clause—in place of the Equal Protection Clause.148 Because abortion regulations 
were initially created to “ensure that women perfor[m] their obligations as 
wives and mothers[,]”149 abortion regulations require a more scrutinizing 
judicial review than that which Due Process jurisprudence provides.  When 
properly analyzed under Virginia’s exceedingly persuasive justification 
standard, the constitutional defects in the government’s use of this harmful and 
prejudiced sex-based classification are effectively exposed. Thorough scrutiny of 
the Equal Protection Clause reveals that abortion regulations have not only 
thwarted women’s economic and political equality in society—but they have 
ultimately failed to prevent the termination of unwanted pregnancies. 
The true success of the Virginia Court’s Equal Protection Clause analysis, 
therefore, is its ability to root out the true, discriminatory purposes behind the 
government’s use of sex-based classifications. As the Court’s analysis in Virginia 
demonstrates, the government’s continued adherence to traditional sex 
stereotypes not only unconstitutionally burdens one sex, but more importantly, 
precludes the government from implementing innovative and effective policies 
that would actually achieve the government’s stated compelling interest. 
Women—and the unborn lives they collectively create with men—would 
benefit greatly if the government focused on policies and programs that work to 
resolve the true causes of unwanted pregnancies and abortion, rather than 
merely relying on policies that blindly perpetuate prejudicial sex stereotypes. 
When “the State’s . . . purposes are as well served by a gender-neutral 
classification as one that gender classifies and therefore carries with it the 
baggage of sexual stereotypes, the State cannot be permitted to classify on the 
basis of sex.”150 
 
 
 148. Thus, where the Substantive Due Process Clause fails, the Equal Protection Clause succeeds.  
See Cass Sunstein, Sexual Orientation and the Constitution: A Note on the Relationship Between Due 
Process and Equal Protection, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 1161, 1174 (1988) (contrasting the Equal Protection 
Clause with the Substantive Due Process Clause, by noting that “the Equal Protection Clause looks 
forward, serving to invalidate practices that were widespread at the time of its ratification and that 
were expected to endure. The two clauses therefore operate along different tracks . . . [the Equal 
Protection Clause] does not safeguard traditions; it protects against traditions, however long-
standing and deeply rooted.”). 
 149. Ronald Turner, Gonzales v. Carhart and the Court’s “Regret Rationale,” 43 WAKE FOREST L. 
REV. 1, 266 (2008). 
 150. Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268, 283 (1979). 
